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This article proposes an original analysis of the international debate on climate change through the use of digital methods.
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Change. Second, in this paper we test an original approach to text analysis that combines automatic extractions and
manual selection of the key issue-terms. Through this mixed approach, we tried to obtain relevant findings without
imposing them on our corpus. The originality of our corpus and of our approach encouraged us to question some of the
habits of digital research and confront three common misunderstandings about digital methods that we discuss in the
first part of the article (section ‘Three misunderstandings on digital methods in social sciences’). In addition to reflecting
on methodology, however, we also wanted to offer some substantial contribution to the understanding of UN-framed
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Introduction
This article proposes an original analysis of the inter-
national negotiations on climate change through the
use of digital methods. Its originality is twofold.
First, it examines a corpus of reports on climate
negotiations never explored before through digital tech-
niques. This corpus is particularly interesting because it
provides the most consistent and detailed reporting of
the proceedings of the negotiations of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) between 1995 and 2013. Though digital
data have been already employed to analyze the discus-
sions on global warming, their use has been so far lim-
ited to more ‘‘traditional’’ datasets extracted from
bibliographic archives (see, for example, Anderegg
et al., 2010; Bjurstro¨m and Polk, 2011; Li et al., 2011;
Stanhill, 2001) and social media (Niederer, 2013;
Rogers and Marres, 2000). Compared to these ‘‘trad-
itional’’ datasets, our corpus is novel for its conditions
of production – the reports are digital summaries of
roundtable discussions of the UNFCCC meetings –
and for its challenging format – each summary com-
piles statements made by all the participating parties.
Second, in this paper we test an original approach to
text analysis that combines automatic extractions and
manual selection of the key issue-terms. Through such
an approach, we wanted to avoid the drawbacks of
grounding the extraction of the terms uniquely on
quantitative indicators or on the qualitative judgment
of experts. Iterating the interactions between expertise
and computation, we let the dictionary of analysis
emerge from our texts, but not in a purely automatic
way. Through this mixed approach, we tried to obtain
relevant ﬁndings, without imposing them on our
corpus.
The originality of our corpus and of our approach
encouraged us to question some of the habits of digital
research and confront three common misunderstand-
ings about digital methods that we discuss in the ﬁrst
part of the article (section ‘Three misunderstandings on
digital methods in social sciences’).
In addition to reﬂecting on methodology, however,
we also wanted to oﬀer some substantial contribution
to the understanding of UN-framed climate
diplomacy. In the second part of the article (section
‘Three maps on climate negotiations’) we will there-
fore introduce some of the preliminary results of our
analysis. By discussing three visualizations, we will
analyze the thematic articulation of the climatic
negotiations, the rise and fall of these themes over
time and the visibility of diﬀerent countries in the
debate.
Three misunderstandings on digital
methods in social sciences
The appearance of digital traces has triggered contra-
dictory feelings among social scientists. While optimists
welcome enthusiastically a new source of information,
potentially richer and less expensive than traditional
datasets (Kleinberg, 2008; Watts, 2007), pessimists
show distrust towards the turmoil caused by a ﬂood
of muddled traces.
By this article, we wish to contribute to the debate
on digital data in the social sciences (cf. Giles, 2012;
Lazer et al., 2009) by proposing an approach that is
neither enthusiastic nor alarmist. Most diﬃculties, we
believe, derive from a misunderstanding on the nature
of digital methods, or, to be more precise, from three
misunderstandings: ﬁrst, a split-conception of digital
traces that is both too restrictive and too ambitious;
second, a vacillation between disregard and distrust on
the conditions of production of digital traces; ﬁnally, a
tendency to mistake ‘‘digital’’ for ‘‘automatic.’’
Though often uttered orally, these misunderstandings
seldom appear in published papers (scholars who
dislike digital methods tend to avoid them more
than explicitly criticizing them). Direct or reported
evidence of such misunderstandings can, however, be
found in literature (Barnes, 2014; Bollier and
Firestone, 2010; Boyd and Crawford, 2011;
Carr, 2014; Cresswell, 2014; Dalton and Thatcher,
2014; Gayo-Avello, 2012; Harford, 2014; Law et al.,
2011; Lazer et al., 2014; Manovich, 2012; Marcus and
Davis, 2014; Marres, 2012; Rieder and Ro¨hle, 2012;
Savage and Burrows, 2007; Uprichard, 2012, 2013). In
the ﬁrst part of this article, we will address these three
misunderstandings by describing how we came across
them in our work on climate negotiations.
First misunderstanding: Which digital traces?
The creation of a ‘‘diplomatic’’ corpus. Adopted in 1992 at
the Earth Summit,1 enforced in March 1994, and rati-
ﬁed by 195 countries, the UNFCCC aims at
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system
[ . . . ] within a time frame suﬃcient to allow ecosystems
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable eco-
nomic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.2
Although UNFCCC’s discussions are often docu-
mented by NGOs, political constituencies, and
researchers, these traces are not systematically collected
and easily exploitable by digital research. Therefore, we
ﬁrst had to identify traces suﬃciently representative
and suﬃciently structured to be processed by the avail-
able tools of analysis.
Among the available documentation, the most inter-
esting is Volume 12 of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin
(ENB).3 Released by the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD), the ENB provides
daily reports on 33 separate UN negotiations on envir-
onment and development. The ENB archive contains
thousands of reports on dozens of multilateral agree-
ments. Volume 12, dedicated to climate negotiations,
contains 594 issues. The ENB provides a workable
proxy with which to analyze all the climate negotiations
(and avoid drowning in the thousands of disparate
documents stocked on the website of the UNFCCC).
In this article, we will principally recount the construc-
tion and treatment of this dataset that is so much unlike
the sources generally used by practitioners of digital
methods.
There are more things in Internet and Web (Horatio) than are
indexed in your platforms. The necessity to use very spe-
cialized traces such as those provided by the ENB led us
to reﬂect on the ﬁrst misunderstanding on digital meth-
ods: the supposed impossibility to standardize results
obtained on digital samples to oﬄine populations
(Couper, 2000).4 This diﬃculty is, to a large extent, due
to the fact that digital traceability is often reduced to its
most visible instances: the huge Internet platforms such
as Google, Facebook, Wikipedia, Twitter, LinkedIn, or
Amazon. Too often, the myth of ‘‘big data’’ reduces the
richness of digital data to a mere question of size.
Hence, the delusion that the mere size of social
media’s APIs (Application Programming interface)
could be the key to understanding collective life.
Unfortunately, as classic statistics has made very
clear, the representativeness of a sample depends only
indirectly upon its size. The quality of a sample rather
lies in its similarity to the sampled population and in its
capacity to include the same variability:
Typically researchers focus on sample size as the most
important consideration in achieving representative-
ness: how many texts must be included in the corpus,
and how many words per text sample. Books on sam-
pling theory, however, emphasize that sample size is
not the most important consideration in selecting a rep-
resentative sample; rather, a thorough deﬁnition of the
target population and decisions concerning the
method of sampling are prior considerations.
Representativeness refers to the extent to which a
sample includes the full range of variability in a popu-
lation. (Biber, 1993: 243)
The value of the digital traceability is not a question of
size and cannot be measured by the gigantism of a few
digital platforms. The real impact of the digital trace-
ability should be sought in the increasing diversity of
the traces available for social research. This diversiﬁca-
tion allows quantifying objects that so far were hard to
measure and encourages us to reﬂect on how we select
and build our corpora. Such is the ﬁrst methodological
lesson we draw from the diﬃculties and the possibilities
oﬀered by our ‘‘unconventional’’ diplomatic corpus.
Second misunderstanding: Whose digital traces?
It is important to clarify the meanings of two expres-
sions frequently used in this article: ‘‘digital traces’’ and
‘‘digital data.’’ Though there are many ways of deﬁning
both terms (see Reigeluth, 2014 for a detailed discus-
sion), we propose here a simple and methodological
distinction. In this article, ‘‘digital traces’’ refers to
any set of bits stored in the memory of a digital
device (a computer, in most cases) as a result of the
deliberate implementation of tracing systems. ‘‘Digital
data’’ are instead the organized set of information, pro-
duced from digital traces through the work of research-
ers that select, clean and exploit them in a speciﬁc
study. Our distinction between traces and data is delib-
erately non-substantive: traces are not necessarily more
raw, spurious, or primitive than data. The diﬀerence is
purely methodological. Its objective is to remind us that,
in digital research, the work done to adapt the infor-
mation to the investigation’s objectives (data) is most of
the time preceded by the work done by someone else to
make such information available (traces).5 The trace/
data distinction invites us to consider both operations
with the greatest attention as they both inﬂuence
research results.
Our work on the ENB corpus provides a good exam-
ple of this, as knowledge of its production context was
essential not only in the harvesting process but also
throughout the whole analysis and the interpretation
of the results. The second lesson we can draw from
our case study concerns therefore the origins of digital
traces and encourages us to reﬂect on the processes that
convert traces into data.
The building up of the ENB corpus and its original
recipients. The ENB was started as an initiative of
three experts participating in the Rio Summit of 1992.
At the end of the conference, the IISD contacted the
founding members and oﬀered to publish the report
during the next negotiations. Today, the writing of
the ENB report results from a collective work of four
permanent experts,6 several part-time administrative
staﬀ, two full-time translators, and 60 consultant
experts from 32 countries. Most of the members are
PhD candidates or PhDs with some experience in the
domain of environment and development.
In the case of the climate negotiations, ENB covers
the oﬃcial proceedings of conferences and, when pos-
sible, the discussion in the corridors. Each ENB
issue reports on a day of negotiations. It includes
an introduction, a short history of the negotiations,
and the transcription of the discussions. The ﬁrst
audience for these texts is the negotiations’ actors, to
whom paper reports are distributed during the negoti-
ations. The complete archive of the issues is then
available on the IISD website. The ENB reports
do not go into the details of the discussions, but they
propose a point-by-point paraphrasing of the argu-
ments exchanged and a summary of the outcomes of
the negotiations.
The content of the reports must be balanced, inde-
pendent, and substantiated by the testimony of several
participants. In order to ensure consistency in style,
ENB authors and editors are speciﬁcally trained and
provided with a style handbook. This handbook details
the structure of the reports (characterized by very strict
templates: establishing, for example, a maximum length
of 1800–1900 words for the daily issues). The handbook
prescribes a clinical style – warning the authors against
adjectives and adverbs: ‘‘while it makes writing and
reading the Bulletin particularly boring, it also removes
any overt signs of subjectivity’’ (ENB Manual and Style
Guide, p. 53) and suggests a list of 65 preferable verbs to
avoid injecting ambiguity or motive regarding actors’
statements.
The very standardized structure of the ENB is one of
its main interests as a collection for digital analysis:
unlike the UNFCCC original negotiation documents,
this high level of standardization (in terms of language,
text structure, availability of metadata) makes this
corpus relatively homogeneous and thus facilitates
automatic processing.
(Most) digital data were not created for social
research. Exploiting a set of traces collected for pur-
poses other than scientiﬁc research is not unusual digi-
tal research. Most digital traces are collected for
purposes of marketing (such as loyalty or credit
cards), surveillance (as in air travel), technical optimiza-
tion (as in telecommunication networks), or informa-
tion sharing (as in the ENB reports we address in this
paper). In one way or the other, they are second-hand
data, the production of which is not directly controlled
by the researches.
Using these traces requires therefore questioning the
conditions of their production. When the World Bank
published its data (openknowledge.worldbank.org/
about), we have to ask how these data were computed
and why they are disclosed (Tabor, 2012). If American
Online releases by mistake 20 million search requests,7
we have to ask whether the use of these data is ethically
fair (Ess and AoIR ethics working committee, 2002). If
Wikipedia grants access to the full edit history of all its
articles (mediawiki.org/wiki/API), we have to reﬂect on
the epistemic statute of this collective enterprise (Viegas
et al., 2007).
To reﬂect on how digital data were created means
to resist the temptation to naturalize them. Digital
data are more similar to traces collected in a bubble
chamber than to footprints left on wet sand: they exist
because someone collected and processed them.
Remaining conscious that digital data are always pro-
duced in a speciﬁc context, however, does not lessen
their interest. Despite the etymology, data are never
given: data always result from a long chain of actions,
some of which escape the control of the experimenter
(Latour, 1995). To admit that digital traces are not
natural items but artifacts created in a speciﬁc envir-
onment and with speciﬁc objectives does not reduce
their value. The process of their creation also bears
relevant knowledge.
In our case, the ENB writing process is particularly
well documented, and this oriented our analysis: the
standardization of the texts makes lexical analysis rele-
vant; the thematic focus of paragraphs deﬁnes the
granularity of the co-occurrences of words; the use of
a limited list of verbs allows us to identify the position
of the actors, etc.
Third misunderstanding: What is digital research?
The abundance of digital data and computational
resources has stirred a scientiﬁc excitement over a
potential ‘‘mechanization’’ of digital research. ‘‘Big
data’’ would reduce the need for the researcher’s inter-
vention, evacuate the task of ﬁtting data to existing
theories, and allow prediction without the fragility of
interpretation. In other words, the researchers’ inter-
vention would become increasingly expendable.
The conﬁdence in quantiﬁcation is not recent (think
of Isaac Asimov’s ‘‘psychohistory’’), but the develop-
ment of digital technology has renewed this faith.
Our experience with the ENB corpus, however,
points to diﬀerent conclusions. Even though without
the help of the computer it would have been impossible
to consider each and every word of the ENB Volume 12
(given its size and complexity), the intervention of the
researcher remains crucial. Indeed, simply running the
raw material through the ‘‘machine’’ could only pro-
duce disappointing results. But the point here is not to
defend manual analyses against automated ones (or the
other way around), rather to show that good results can
be obtained only by combining the two.
The slow process of map creation. Our corpus was built
from the 594 issues contained in Volume 12 of the
ENB, from the conferences in New York in 1995 to
the conference in Warsaw in 2013. From all these
issues, we only kept the daily issues related to the
COPs (Conference of the Parties).8 To keep close to
the diplomatic dimension of the negotiations, we put
aside the issues related to other UNFCCCS bodies such
as the Subsidiary Body for Scientiﬁc and Technological
Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation.
The second step is dedicated to analysis. Ours relies
on paragraphs – each paragraph corresponding to a
natural thematic unit according to the production and
format of these reports. The corpus analysis platform
Cortext (http://manager.cortext.net/) of IFRIS was
then used to (1) analyze the lexical content of the col-
lection of bulletins, (2) identify the main clusters emer-
ging from the negotiations thanks to the network
analysis applied to a matrix of co-occurrences between
extracted words, and (3) analyze the proﬁles of diﬀerent
actors by qualifying which frame of words was mobi-
lized by which countries during diﬀerent COPs.
The analysis starts by the lexical extraction (using a
mixed algorithm constructed around linguistic and stat-
istical approaches) of the most relevant nominal groups
(which will simply be referred to as ‘‘terms’’ for more
convenience) in the whole set of corpus
paragraphs (5663). Since the algorithms are used to sort
the terms according to their frequency and ‘‘speciﬁ-
city,’’ by force, they pick up a range of uninteresting
or irrelevant terms (as well as mis-categorizing relevant
terms); we cleaned and corrected the term lists manu-
ally, which allowed us to keep only the terms referring
to well-identiﬁed themes (‘‘issues’’) that could be qua-
liﬁed as actual topics under discussion in the negoti-
ations. This process involved a great deal of iteration,
requiring us to go back and forth between the texts of
the corpus itself, the data, the statistics connected to the
lexical extraction, and the network of co-occurrences.
Finally, we have kept terms characterized by their
frequency (at least seven occurrences in the corpus) and
their relevance (the tendency to be used in speciﬁc lin-
guistic contexts of the negotiations, e.g. ‘‘historical
responsibility’’). We have rejected terms that were not
speciﬁc enough or could be ambiguous (e.g. ‘‘increased
eﬀorts’’). We have also merged the declensions of terms
(‘‘social cost’’ and ‘‘social costs’’), equivalent forms
(e.g. ‘‘technological transfer’’ and ‘‘transfer of technol-
ogies’’), and terms that were clearly synonyms
(e.g. GHGs and Green House Gases). Out of a list of
1178 terms extracted, we have thus compiled a diction-
ary of terms of about 300 nominal groups (both
lists are available at: http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/
publications/misunderstandings/).
Finally, we have ‘‘mapped’’ the negotiations’
topics and created, from this map, thematic proﬁles.
The operations we carried out to render the results
of our analysis visually, through networks and
stream-graphs, are detailed below and are crucial
as they distinguish our investigation from more con-
ventional approaches of computer-assisted discourse
analysis.
The count of term co-occurrences within one para-
graph of the corpus allowed us to calculate a semantic
network. In this network, terms are linked with a
strength proportional to a co-occurrence-based meas-
ure of similarity introduced by Weeds and Weir (2005).
In brief, two terms are all the more close when they
co-occur with the same terms. This distributional meas-
ure builds a semantic weighted network featuring a very
large number of edges that should be ﬁltered before
being mapped. We rely on the topological properties
of the network to eliminate those links whose intensity
is below a threshold. We simply ﬁnd the critical
parameter for which the network is still made of one
giant connected component. The rationale behind this
choice is that we want to preserve the ‘‘macroscopic
structure’’ of the network (how diﬀerent parts of the
network are relatively positioned) while selecting only
most salient edges that contribute to the mesoscopic
structures. A clustering algorithm (Blondel et al.,
2008) then allowed us to identify 12 cohesive subsets
of the network corresponding to the main themes dis-
cussed in the negotiations (see Figure 1). Each para-
graph in the corpus has then been labeled with one or
several topics from this list, according to the terms it
contains (see Figure 10). Paragraphs have also been
labeled according to the ‘‘players’’ referred to in the
text (at least one occurrence of the name or demonym
of the country involved) (see Figure 7).
Digital is not automated. The last misunderstanding on
digital methods is both the subtlest and the most diﬃ-
cult to overcome. The diﬃculty lies in a double ambi-
guity that ﬁrst takes ‘‘digital’’ for ‘‘automated’’ and
then ‘‘automated’’ for ‘‘objective.’’ To correct this mis-
understanding, we need to tackle these two parts
separately.
The ﬁrst ambiguity comes from a tendency to see in
digital technologies nothing but the capacity to auto-
mate repetitive processes. The computer then would
only be a tool to relieve researchers from their most
‘‘mechanical’’ tasks. This is undoubtedly one of the
computer’s contributions, but certainly not the only
one. The history of sciences teaches that whenever a
new tool imposes itself in research practice, it inﬂuences
the course of that science. The telescope has not only
allowed us to see farther but it has also allowed us to
see diﬀerently. The printing press did not only allow us
to print more books, but it also allowed us to print new
texts (Eisenstein, 1979). Thus, digital technologies do
not just assist traditional research methods; they
create new scientiﬁc practices (Rogers, 2013).
Researchers willing to make their life easier would
not ﬁnd here what they are looking for. Digital meth-
ods question research habits and assumptions and
require taking many decisions. We are very far from
the concept of automation: computerized research is
neither faster nor easier. The experience of a digital
project is the experience of a series of successive impedi-
ments. First, choices must be made on how to harvest
the traces: what we are tracking is not as easy to collect
as we had thought. The traces are messier than
expected, and transforming them into data is problem-
atic (how to correct the mistakes, detect the duplicates,
manage normalization, remove irrelevant results?).
Second, we have to select the most appropriate analysis
tools: analysis algorithms are numerous, but they are
all poorly documented and must all be adjusted to the
available data. Third, results must be visualized, but
how to choose among dozens of possible results and
visualizations? And after having overcome all these
impediments, we often obtain disappointing results
that force us to reconsider all choices made throughout
the process. And start again.
But the diﬃculty does not only lie in the amount of
work necessary to practice digital methods.
The obstacle is often conceptual and results from the
second ambiguity hidden in this last misunderstand-
ing: the one between ‘‘automated’’ and ‘‘objective.’’
The Cartesian precept on the evidence of scientiﬁc
truth lends potent strength to the idea that automa-
tion might lead us to an epistemological Promised
Land. In this version of digital utopianism, we do
not automate research processes out of laziness, but
because we want to make results more ‘‘objective.’’
The idea is that the more mechanical the process,
the fewer interventions are required from the
researcher, the more the results will be free from the
researcher’s interpretive subjectivity.
To be sure, the new digital traces encourage us to
question the presuppositions of the classic social the-
ories (Latour et al., 2012; Venturini and Latour, 2010)
and to observe social phenomena more directly.
However, this does not mean that results could emerge
spontaneously from the data with no need of human
arbitration. This utopia is best described in a provoca-
tive article by Chris Anderson apocalyptically titled
‘‘The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the
Scientiﬁc Method Obsolete’’:
Scientists are trained to recognize that correlation is not
causation, that no conclusions should be drawn simply
on the basis of correlation between X and Y (it could
just be a coincidence). Instead, you must understand
the underlying mechanisms that connect the two.
Once you have a model, you can connect the data
sets with conﬁdence. Data without a model is just
noise. But faced with massive data, this approach to
science — hypothesize, model, test — is becoming
obsolete . . .
There is now a better way. Petabytes allow us to say:
‘‘Correlation is enough.’’ We can stop looking for
models. We can analyze the data without hypotheses
about what it might show. We can throw the numbers
into the biggest computing clusters the world has ever
seen and let statistical algorithms ﬁnd patterns where
science cannot.
Figure 1. Network of terms co-occurring in the same paragraphs of the ENB. Node position is determined by a force vector
algorithm (Jacomy et al., forthcoming) bringing together terms directly or indirectly linked, and keeping away terms with fewer co-
occurrences. Node size is proportional to their frequency in the corpus. Node color follows the clusters identified by the clustering
algorithm. The names of the clusters have been attributed manually. A high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found
at: http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/misunderstandings/ and http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F1.
large.jpg.
It does not take a relentless philosopher, nor a staunch
supporter of human thought to ﬁnd the weakness in
this argument. Anybody who has experienced digital
methods knows that data are never given. Anderson
refers to ‘‘numbers,’’ ‘‘measure,’’ and ‘‘correlation’’ as
if they were obvious and unproblematic, whereas
experience of computerized research teaches how diﬃ-
cult it is to choose among the proliferation of numbers,
measures, and correlations always contradictory and
questionable. And the increasing number and diversity
of sources brought about by ‘‘big data’’ is not making
things any easier. Far from ‘‘throwing numbers into big
computing clusters,’’ digital research is about making
uncertain and painful arbitrations on the basis of our
‘‘non-automatizable’’ understanding. This suggests, by
the way, that (until our methods are more stabilized) it
might be a good idea to refrain from using the biggest
datasets and focus instead on small or medium digital
data – which allows direct observation and does not
require us to rely exclusively on algorithmic treatment.
Three maps on climate negotiations
It is now time to provide some evidence that the
approach we just described can be used to obtain rele-
vant results in researching social phenomena. Drawing
on the data of the ENB corpus and navigating our
way through the three misunderstandings we dis-
cussed, we have produced three ‘‘maps’’ on the
international negotiations on climate change: one net-
work of the terms co-occurring in the paragraphs of
the ENB and two stream-graphs presenting the vari-
ations in the visibility of the diﬀerent countries and
themes of the negotiations. In this second part of the
article, we will propose a possible reading of these
maps. Such a reading is meant not only to oﬀer
insights to climate experts and negotiation actors9
but also to provide an example of visual data explor-
ation, which could hopefully inspire scholars working
on other digital data.
First map: The negotiations issues
The ﬁrst map shows a graph of terms related to issues
discussed throughout climate negotiations since the
UNFCCC was adopted (1995–2013) (see Figure 1).
There are many ways of making sense of a co-occur-
rence graph. The most common is to calculate a series
of statistics in order to detect the most important terms
and their semantic context. In this article, we will pro-
pose a diﬀerent approach, one that is based on the
visual observation of the co-occurrence network. We
will, in particular, consider one cluster after the other
and follow the connections of the most important
terms.
The network is organized around ﬁve main macro-
themes (Figure 1):
. GHGs emissions and Kyoto Protocol (on the left).
. Fuels and transport sector, energy and technology
transfers, and clean development mechanism
(CDM) (at the top).
. Carbon sinks – Reducing emissions from deforest-
ation and forest degradation (REDD) and land use,
land use change and forests (LULUCF) (at the
bottom).
. Impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, and funding
and equity (on the right).
. Models and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (at the center).
The crossroad of scientific expertise. The cluster ‘‘Models
and IPCC’’ (see Figure 2) is located at the intersection
of four other themes of the negotiations. To describe
the hub role of this cluster, let us take a closer look at
the terms of stabilization designating the UNFCCC
fundamental target. The terms that surround it more
closely may serve to characterize it: greenhouse gas con-
centrations (the object of stabilization), 350 parts per
million (the target ﬁgure), carbon dioxide-equivalent
(the measure), and the political will (necessary to
reach stabilization).
Following the connections of the stabilization we can
describe how the negotiations are articulated. Toward
the left, stabilization connects to CO2, at the heart of
the ‘‘GHG emissions measure’’ cluster (in green) which
deals with the issue of greenhouse gases estimation.
Toward the bottom, stabilization is connected to the
mitigation options, which is one of the two main strate-
gies to ﬁght against climate change. Toward the top,
stabilization is connected to terms related to the other
main strategy to ﬁght climate change: planned and vol-
untary adaptation to the consequences of climate
change.
The mitigation framework. Terms related to the eﬀorts to
mitigate climate change (by reducing GHG emissions)
characterize 7 of the 12 clusters of the networks. These
clusters are grouped in three main semantic arenas
widely scattered across the graph.
Reducing emissions: The ﬁrst mitigation arena is
composed of two clusters representing two fundamental
aspects of the UNFCCC process: GHGs emissions
(GHGs) and the Kyoto Protocol (see Figure 3). The
proximity of these two clusters reveals the primary
target of the UNFCCC: stabilize GHGs concentrations
by mechanisms to reduce emissions.
In the ‘‘GHGs emissions’’ (green) cluster, we can
discern three types of terms. First, there are terms
deﬁning which gases should be reduced (CH4, CO2,
N2O, HFCs, etc.) and how (bubble, gas-by-gas, all
gases, inventories of GHGs emissions). Second, there
are two key terms whose speciﬁcity lies in their hybrid
origin, a mix between science and politics: the dangerous
anthropogenic interferences with climate system and the
levels of 1990 taken as a basis to set reducing targets.
Third, there are political and negotiation terms such as
commitments for non-Annex I countries, new commit-
ments, and common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities.
The cluster conﬁgured around the term Kyoto
Protocol (purple) is made of terms used for the imple-
mentation of the binding reduction mechanisms: ﬁrst
through the Kyoto Protocol, then through the deﬁnition
of its successor. These negotiations, from the Berlin
Mandate (1995) to the Durban Platform (2011), focus
on various aspects: the deﬁnition of a base year, of
reference levels, and of a length of commitment period;
the implementation of ﬂexibility mechanisms, among
which are the emission trading scheme; the deﬁnition
of accounting rules and quantiﬁed emission limitation
and reduction objectives (QELROS) and an agreement
on the mechanisms for the transformation of pledges
into quantiﬁed objectives (pledges into QELROS); the
identiﬁcation of possible means to address the surplus
Assigned Amount Units. At the bottom of the cluster,
terms related to the deﬁnition of future commitments
after the end of the Kyoto Protocol (such as second
commitment period, gap between commitment periods
and binding commitments) connect this cluster to the
post-Kyoto cluster.
Energies, technology transfer, and clean development
projects: In the upper parts of the global negotiations
map, the second mitigation arena is composed of three
thematic clusters (Figure 4). On the left, we ﬁnd two
closely linked clusters, one with terms on reducing
emissions from combustion of fossil fuels, especially
in international transportation, and the other with
terms on technology transfer. These two clusters are
connected (toward the bottom) to the adaptation
issues and in particular to the impacts cluster by the
terms development and sustainable development.
Figure 2. Zoom on the cluster ‘‘Models and IPCC.’’ The cluster contains terms related to the scientific assessment of climate change,
and not surprisingly it is situated at the center of the network where it bridges the clusters on adaptation (to the right) and the clusters on
mitigation (to left, top, and bottom). For more information on how this network has been designed, see the caption of Figure 1. A high-
resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at: http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F2.large.jpg.
On the far right corner of the map, the ‘‘CDM’’
refers to the ﬂexibility mechanism of the Kyoto
Protocol allowing a country to reduce its emissions
implementing projects outside its territory (and in par-
ticular in developing countries). This mechanism fueled
animated debates on two principles surrounding its
implementation. On one hand, the principle of supple-
mentarity: CDM projects are to remain supplemental to
domestic eﬀorts to reduce emissions. On the other
hand, the principle of additionality requires that CDM
projects really make additional reductions of GHGs
emissions that would not have been achieved otherwise.
The projects’ impact assessments are therefore crucial.
Themanagement of carbon sinks: Since theBuenosAires
Plan of Action and the discussions on the deﬁnition of the
implementation rules of the Kyoto Protocol, two new
topics have arisen on the negotiation agenda (Figure 5).
First, discussions to reduce emissions caused by
deforestation emerged in the late 1990s.
These discussions created real controversy, centered
on debates about how to include LULUCF within
Kyoto’s binding targets or oﬀset mechanisms. Some
countries insisted that this type of carbon storage
should be excluded from the Kyoto Protocol because,
in the absence of strict regulations, land management
could become a pretext not to comply with emissions
reduction. These regulations were deﬁned with the
Marrakech agreement setting a limit to the authorized
LULUCF carbon sink deductions and leaving the pos-
sibility for market-based action to help Non-Annex I
countries with land use and forest management and con-
servation. This agreement helped to ensure the ratiﬁca-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004.
Meanwhile, the Kyoto fairness principle (common
but diﬀerentiated responsibilities) was put into question
through the mobilization of the term historical respon-
sibility, a formulation preferred by the BRIC countries.
Not surprisingly, it is precisely this term that connects
Figure 3. Zoom on the clusters ‘‘GHGs emissions’’ and ‘‘Kyoto Protocol.’’ The two clusters are tightly connected and contain terms
related to the reduction of greenhouse gases and the Kyoto agreement. These clusters are connected to the scientific clusters
presented in Figure 2 and to the discussion about the post-Kyoto mitigation agreement (see Figure 5). For more information on how
this network has been designed see the caption of Figure 1. A high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at:
http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F3.large.jpg.
Figure 4. Zoom on the clusters ‘‘Fuels and transport sector,’’ ‘‘energy and technology transfer,’’ and ‘‘clean development
mechanism.’’ Situated at the top of the network, the terms connected to energy and fuels are very tightly connected. Not far,
but in a more marginal position, the cluster dedicated to the CDM contains terms related to the flexibility mechanisms of the
Kyoto Protocol allowing states to reduce their emissions outside their national borders. For more information on how this
network has been designed, see the caption of Figure 1. A high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at:
http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F4.large.jpg.
Figure 5. Zoom on the clusters ‘‘REDD and post-Kyoto’’ and ‘‘land use and forests.’’ Though referring to two thematically distinct
negotiation arenas, the proximity of these two clusters reflects the importance that the question of agriculture and forestry has assumed in
the latest years of the climate negotiations. For more information on how this network has been designed, see the caption of Figure 1. A
high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at: http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F5.large.jpg.
the cluster on Kyoto Protocol to the cluster on post-
Kyoto agreement, linking directly to the term Bali
Action Plan. Adopted in 2007, such a plan deﬁnes the
building blocks, of a post-Kyoto agreement: the
strengthening of the mitigation policies, the setting up
of adaptation policies to the impacts of climate change,
the transfer of technology, as well as the deﬁnition of a
shared vision for long-term cooperative action.
The Bali Action Plan also initiated discussions on
how to reduce emissions caused by deforestation and
forest degradation (REDD) as well as on the possibility
for sectoral approaches to reducing emissions in
developing countries.
The path to adaptation, impacts, and vulnerability. The center
of the map is occupied by three clusters closely
connected and dedicated to the issue of adaptation,
environmental and social impacts, vulnerability and
adaptation action, and adaptive funding and equity
(Figure 6). Compared to the mitigation clusters, adapta-
tion clusters are fewer (three against eight) andmore com-
pact. This shows the diﬀerence of the adaptation status in
the UNFCCC negotiations. Where mitigation is the pri-
mary objective of the conference, and thus formulated in
numerous ways, adaptation, impacts, and vulnerability
seem not only more limited in their articulation, but
also more commonly connected to other themes (which
accounts for their centrality in the map). For the sake of
brevity (and in order to leave space for the other maps),
we are saving the analysis of the adaptation, impacts, and
vulnerability clusters for a forthcoming andmore detailed
article on the politics of adaptation in the negotiations.
Second map: Countries and COPs
Though missing on the ﬁrst map, the temporal dimen-
sion is present in the next two diagrams.10 The second
map shows the number of interventions by COP in the
21 most active countries in the negotiations (according
to the ENB summaries).
In order to read the diagram properly, two things
have to be remarked upon. First, the total number of
paragraphs in each COP is not the same. At ﬁrst glance,
it is clear that the highest number of country occur-
rences appears during COP6 (The Hague) and COP15
(Copenhagen), which could mean that these negoti-
ations were the most passionate. The Hague conference
was a failure, leading to the organization of the
Figure 6. Zoom on the clusters ‘‘environmental and social impacts,’’ ‘‘vulnerability and adaptation,’’ and ‘‘funding and equity.’’ The
three clusters contain the terms connected to the discussion about adaptation to climate change in the UNFCCC. Interestingly, these
three clusters are tightly connected and located at the center of the network, suggesting that the debate about adaptation may be
more ‘‘compact’’ and thematically coherent than the debate about mitigation (which is more present but also more dispersed in the
network). For more information on how this network has been designed, see the caption of Figure 1. A high-resolution and zoomable
version of this image can be found at: http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F6.large.jpg.
COP6bis (Bonn) that same year, and COP15 performed
well under expectations, failing to produce a post-
Kyoto agreement. However, it is also possible that
these two COPs were just covered in more detail by
the staﬀ of the ENB. For this reason, one can compare
the size of diﬀerent countries in one COP and the rela-
tive position of one ﬂow through time, but one should
not compare sizes over diﬀerent COPs.
The second remark concerns the fact that while count-
ing the number of occurrences of each country name, we
did not distinguish between the sentences in which coun-
tries appear as subjects and the sentences in which they
are mentioned as objects. However, we have noticed that
in most cases the occurrence of a country name signals
that the country has ‘‘taken the ﬂoor’’ in the negotiations.
As a consequence, our measure indicates, strictly speak-
ing, the visibility of a country in a COP, but it can also be
read more largely as an indicator of activity.
In general, the diagram shows an outstanding stabil-
ity: most countries stick to their relative position during
the 19 COPs. The 10 most active countries are repre-
sented by a rather stable, small group, which includes
the United States, China, Europe, Australia, and
Japan. The three leaders of the negotiations – China,
the United States, and Europe – are ubiquitous and
heading the negotiations. China, often speaking in the
name of the G77 developing countries, never ranks
beyond third position whereas Europe’s position
varies between the ﬁrst and ﬁfth ranks, and the
United States between the ﬁrst and seventh ranks. It
can also be observed that countries tend to be more
active when they host the negotiations: Germany is
ﬁrst in Berlin 1995, Japan is fourth in Kyoto 1997;
India is fourth in New Delhi 2002; Canada is ﬁfth in
Montreal 2005.
Several exceptions should, however, be outlined.
First, the Philippines and Bolivia, two countries from
the southern hemisphere, have taken on very active
roles, perhaps disproportionate with their size. Bolivia
– very discreet during the ﬁrst 15 COPs – has stood out
Figure 7. Streamgraph of the absolute and relative visibility of negotiation parties. The size of each country’s flow is proportional to
the number of paragraphs in which it is mentioned (the bigger the flow in any given COP, the more visible the country was at the time).
Then, flows are sorted according to the number of occurrences: for each COP, the highest flow corresponds to the most active
country while the lowest corresponds to the least active. For example, the United States is the most visible country in the first
meeting and China in the last. A high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at: http://medialab.sciences-po.
fr/publications/misunderstandings/ and http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F7.large.jpg.
Figure 8. Figure 7 filtered to show only the flows of Bolivia (violet) and the Philippines (light blue), two countries remarkable for an
increase in their visibility in the last UNFCCC’s Conferences of Parties. For more information on how this diagram has been designed,
see the caption of Figure 7. A high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at: http://medialab.sciences-po.
fr/publications/misunderstandings/ and http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F8.large.jpg.
Figure 9. Figure 7 filtered to show only the flows of Canada (brown) and Germany (green). In contrast to the countries of Figure 8,
these two countries have been chosen because their visibility decreases in the last years of the climate negotiations. If the case of
Germany can be explained by the decision of the European states to negotiate as a group rather than individually, the decrease in
Canada’s visibility may suggest a progressive disengagement of the country from the issue of climate change. For more information on
how this diagram has been designed, see the caption of Figure 7. A high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at:
http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/misunderstandings/ and http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F9.large.jpg.
fromCOP16 (Cancun) onwards, and has been one of the
leading voices around ‘‘loss and damages.’’ Bolivia often
comments on issues related to the historical responsibil-
ity of developed countries and their compliance with
their commitments to reduce GHGs emissions.
The Philippines’ trajectory is also interesting: quite
conspicuous in the early negotiations (fourth rank at
the INC11 in New York and sixth rank at the COP1
in Berlin), the country steps aside during the next con-
ferences to stand out again in Doha (COP18) and
Warsaw (COP19). If the Philippines mainly speaks
out on equity and ‘‘common but diﬀerentiated respon-
sibilities’’ – principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development – and on funding and
adaptation funds, Doha and Warsaw conferences have
witnessed many references to the two ‘‘unprecedented’’
typhoons that devastated the Philippines (Bopha/
Haiyan) at that very time.
The visibility of some countries increases in a punc-
tuated fashion at very speciﬁc COPs. Mexico, for exam-
ple, shows a rather low proﬁle during most
negotiations, but ranks 5 during COP16 (Cancun),
organized in Mexico. Tuvalu’s trajectory bears
mentioning as well: from the Kyoto conference
onwards, this small Paciﬁc island has ranked among
the 21 most visible member countries. Yet, Tuvalu
also reached rank 13 in Poznan (COP14), rank 19 in
Copenhagen (COP15), and rank 12 in Cancun
(COP16). During these conferences, Tuvalu mainly
addressed the issue of a successor to the Kyoto
Protocol – the island even supports its own protocol
proposition.
We can also testify to the withdrawal of Canada
from climate negotiations. Canada ranks among the
six more visible countries until COP13 in Bali. It then
withdraws from the ranks of top participating coun-
tries at the Poznan conference in 2008. By way of
explanation, in 2006 a new conservative Prime
Minister, Stephen Harper, was elected to lead
Canada and in 2011 the country withdrew from the
Kyoto Protocol and actively initiated unconventional
oil drillings in the Athabasca region of Alberta.
Germany is also less visible after COP1 organized in
Berlin. The reason might be the increasing importance
of the European Union as a representative of its
Member States during the negotiations.
Figure 10. Streamgraph of the absolute and relative visibility of the themes of the negotiation. The size of each theme flow is proportional
to the number of paragraphs in which the two terms defining the themes are present. Then, flows are sorted according to the number of
occurrences: for each COP, the highest flow corresponds to the most visible theme while the lowest corresponds to the least visible. A
high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at: http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/misunderstandings/ and
http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F10.large.jpg.
Third map: Issues and COPs
The third map is built with the same visualization pro-
cess as the second one, but the ﬂows represent the
topics (not the countries) in climate negotiations. The
topics correspond to the clusters identiﬁed in the ﬁrst
map and the computation of their visibility is made by
counting the number of paragraphs in which at least
two words of the same cluster are present.
Whereas adaptation and mitigation issues are both
central at the UNFCCC, mitigation has always been a
top priority on the negotiations’ agenda from the very
beginning. During the UNFCCC’s ﬁrst negotiations,
the focus was on the responsibility of developed coun-
tries and their eﬀort to reduce their GHGs emissions.
Discussions were initiated in Berlin (1995), setting up a
restrictive framework to reduce emissions of the Annex
I countries, an objective that was achieved in 1997 with
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.
In this ﬁrst phase of the negotiations, little attention
was dedicated to the actions of developing countries to
cope with the impacts of climate change, with a notable
exception. From the very beginning, the most vulner-
able members have succeeded in putting on the agenda
the issue of the ﬁnancing of adaptation actions. The
question of adaptation provisions was included in the
Kyoto Protocol (1995) and generated a tense debate on
the mechanisms to ensure this ﬁnancing at The Hague
(COP6) with members disagreeing on the types of
ﬁnancing, modalities, and competencies.
Adaptation, however, assumed a greater importance
in the second phase of the negotiations. With all parties
facing diﬃculties in achieving their mitigation object-
ives, debates on what shall be done regarding vulner-
ability, climate change impacts, and adaptation, as well
as how to ﬁnance these actions, increased between
Marrakech (2000) and Bali (2007) conferences, to
become a matter of general concern. The COPs of
New Delhi (2002) and Buenos Aires (2004) are often
referred to as ‘‘the adaptation COPs.’’ Following a
series of extreme weather events that aﬀected both
developing and developed countries, the COP 11 in
Montreal (2005) marks the end of the illusion of invul-
nerability of developed countries. Adaptation assumed
Figure 11. Figure 10 filtered to show only the flows of funding and equity (brown), vulnerability and adaptation (light blue), social and
environmental impacts (dark blue), REDD and post-Kyoto (pink). This figure shows the evolution of the visibility of the three main
clusters of terms related to adaptation. Whereas the debate on funding (in brown) is present throughout all the negotiations, the debate
on the impacts of global warming (in dark blue) seems to gain visibility only in the last years of negotiation. The question of vulnerability
(in light blue) seems to be highly discussed in the central years of the negotiations, but to lose visibility when the question of the post-
Kyoto agreements (in pink) becomes central. For more information on how this diagram has been designed, see the caption of Figure 10.
A high-resolution and zoomable version of this image can be found at: http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/misunderstandings/ and
http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714543804/F11.large.jpg.
therefore a central place in the negotiation as recog-
nized by the four pillars of the Bali Action Plan
(2007), which include adaptation as well as mitigation,
technology transfer, and ﬁnancing within a perspective
of long-term coordinated action. Since the Poznan con-
ference (COP14), adaptation seems deﬁnitively estab-
lished as a subject of climate diplomacy and is
therefore less discussed.
The discussions in Nairobi (2006) evolved toward
the operationalization of adaptation funds while the
consequences of climate change became more apparent.
In the last COPs, the debate around adaptation shares
increasing ‘‘ﬂoor time’’ with a renewed interest in
carbon sinks (forest and agriculture), raised by the
United States, and the debate on how to help develop-
ing countries achieve their objectives in terms of emis-
sion reduction. In this context, land-use mechanisms,
land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF), CDM and
compliance projects are strongly debated. An agree-
ment was reached in Buenos Aires (2004) and Bali
(2007) and the debate on these issues, as well as on
technology transfers in order to reduce emissions of
fossil fuels, is reaching a gradual stabilization.
Then, and especially after the Copenhagen failure,
mitigation of industrial emission sources comes back at
the top of the negotiating agenda because of the diﬃ-
culties of ﬁnding a successor to the Kyoto Protocol and
the challenges in implementing REDD and other
developing country emission reduction initiatives.
Adaptation discussion remains, however, important
because of the increasing acknowledgement of the
social impacts of climate change and the proposal of
developing countries to establish a ﬁnancial mechanism
to cover the ‘‘loss and damages’’ that they may suﬀer
because of global warming.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed a digital analysis of a
corpus of reports on the international negotiations on
climate change. Though such an investigation is still in
progress, the analysis has allowed us to highlight three
common diﬃculties in digital research and to obtain
three preliminary visualizations. The two results are
of course connected. As we have tried to show, digital
research can only be productive when scholars:
1. Draw on the appropriate corpus of digital traces (the
ﬁrst misunderstanding would have led us to search
traces on climate diplomacy in generic datasets such
as the scientiﬁc literature or the social media).
2. Take into consideration the conditions of produc-
tion of such traces (the second misunderstanding
would have led us to mistake our proxy on the nego-
tiations – the ENB – for the phenomenon itself,
thereby disregarding the speciﬁc mediations oper-
ated by such a proxy and its speciﬁc format).
3. Are not afraid to make the choices and the eﬀorts
necessary to clean, transform, visualize, and inter-
pret the data that they have collected (the third mis-
understanding would have dissuaded us from using
what we know to mine interesting ﬁndings out of the
overabundance of variables and correlations).
By gathering a corpus of traces speciﬁcally focused
on climate negotiations, by investigating and exploiting
the characteristic nature of such traces, and by using
our expertise of climate diplomacy to cultivate the
emergence of interesting ﬁndings, we have obtained
three interesting results. First, we have been able to
identify the thematic clustering of the discussions in
the UNFCCC and the articulation among the diﬀerent
issues. Second, we have been able to track the visibility
of diﬀerent countries across 18 years and 21 inter-
national meetings. Third, we have visualized the rise
and fall of the diﬀerent themes of climate diplomacy.
These results are promising because they are both
expected and surprising. In developing new digital meth-
ods for the social sciences, we ﬁnd ourselves confronted
by the classic problem of the ‘‘experimenter regress.’’ As
Harry Collins (1975) observed in the case of relativistic
physics, the problem of original research is that, since
both its methods and its theories are tentative, it is hard
to ﬁnd a stable ground to establish its validity. This is
also true in the case of digital research. Since this
research intends to renew social theory through a
series of novel research methods, its claims are still dif-
ﬁcult to ground: both its conceptual and its methodo-
logical tools remain uncertain. The only way to
bootstrap digital social sciences out of the experimenter
regress is to compare its results with those obtained in
traditional research and hope that our ﬁndings are con-
sistent enough with previous knowledge to be credible
and yet original enough to provide new insights.
To some extent, this is what we obtained with the three
maps we just presented. The ﬁrst and the third maps illu-
strated, as expected, the preeminent role in climate diplo-
macy of the questions related to mitigation. Mitigation
constitutes the bulk of UNFCCC’s discussions. Its diﬀer-
ent sub-issues (the measure of GHGs, the technology
transfer, the transports, the CDM, the carbon sinks in
land and forests) spread all over and throughout all the
negotiations. Mitigation articulates the space of the
debate (infusing the discussions on GHGs reduction,
encouraging energy transition, and defending the
carbon sinks) and deﬁnes its rhythm (with the ﬂuctuation
of the debates about a binding protocol).
Adaptation, on the other hand, appears as a speciﬁc
topic of the negotiations: a tightly connected group of
issues located in a precise position on the map. Yet, and
this was not obvious before our analysis, adaptation
appears to occupy the center of the climate negotiations
and to have been present and highly visible from the
very beginning of the negotiations. These ﬁndings stand
out against the many claims in the literature about cli-
mate diplomacy as to an ‘‘adaptation turn’’ in the last
years of the negotiation (Howard, 2009; Pielke et al.,
2007). But comparing closely maps 1 and 3, an inter-
esting explanation emerges. What has always been pre-
sent and visible in the negotiations is not the whole
discussion about adaptation but the speciﬁc question
of adaptation ﬁnance. Interestingly, this question
appears to be the most marginal of the adaptation-
related topics, with a position that is not structurally
diﬀerent from that of the topics of mitigation. An
‘‘adaptation turn,’’ however, can be recognized in the
rise of the question of vulnerability (from COP9 to
COP14) and in the more recent ascent of the question
of the climate impacts (from COP15). These are the two
clusters that occupy the center of map 1. Reading the
two maps together, therefore, the hypothesis can be
made that, in the last 10 years, the emergence of the
ﬁrst recognizable eﬀects of climate change has grad-
ually occupied the center of the negotiation scene, not
as much replacing the previous discussion but somehow
bridging discussions that would have been separated
otherwise. This hypothesis, to be sure, needs to be con-
ﬁrmed by further analysis (which we are currently car-
rying out), but this little example has at least showed
that, when performed properly, digital research can
produce original and consistent results.
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Notes
1. United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro.
2. This is Article 1 of the Convention, which can be
found online at: unfccc.int/files/essential_background/
background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/
conveng.pdf
3. The entire text of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Volume
12, is available at: http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/.
4. On the invention of ‘‘representativity’’ in classical statis-
tics, cf. Desrosie`res, 1991 (in particular pp. 211–213).
5. See Hedman et al. for a more detailed repertoire of the
work on data in digital social sciences. In another field
(climatology), cf. Paul Edwards’ (2010) discussion of the
construction, turnover and continual transformation of
data in climate modeling (particularly chapters 8 and 10).
6. Cf. http://www.iisd.ca/about/staff.htm, http://www.iisd.
ca/about/e´quipe/
7. Cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL_search_data_scandal
8. Since 2005, COPs have been held simultaneously with
MOPs (Meeting of Parties of the Kyoto Protocol),
whose report is included in the same document.
9. The work described in this article has become the basis
for a more systematic initiative to analyze the debate in
the UNFCCC. This initiative is meant to create an online
platform to map the discussion of COP21 in 2015 in
Paris. Such platform should provide the actors of the
debate (negotiators, NGOs, lobbies, journalists) as well
as the general public with a better grasp on the complex-
ity of climate negotiations.
10. All following figures (from Figures 7 to 11) have been
designed by Martina Elisa Cecchi, whom we thank a lot
for her extraordinary work.
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